Until recently, India's intransigent negotiating posture has conveyed the impression that it will not accept any carbon emissions limits without full compensation and more stringent carbon limitation from rich countries. However, our assessment of India's proposed renewable energy standard (RES) indicates that this impression is simply wrong. India is seriously considering a goal of 15 percent renewable energy in its power mix by 2020, despite the absence of any meaningful international pressure to cut emissions, no guarantees of compensatory financing, and a continuing American failure to adopt stringent emissions limits. If India moves ahead with this plan, it will promote a massive shift of new power capacity toward renewables within a decade. We estimate the incremental cost of this change from coal-fired to renewable power to be about $50 billion-an enormous sum for a society that must still cope with widespread extreme poverty. If India moves ahead with its current plan, it should give serious pause to those who have resisted U.S. carbon regulation on the grounds on that it will confer a cost advantage on "intransigent" countries such as India.
Introduction
The past few months have witnessed an interesting development in the high-level discussion of climate policy in India. On October 19, 2009, the Times of India (Sethi, 2009) reported that India's Environment Minister had privately urged the Prime Minister to scrap the Kyoto Protocol's "common but differentiated responsibilities," accept greenhouse gas reductions at India's own cost, without any guarantees of financial or technological support from developed countries, and permit strict external scrutiny of India's mitigation achievements. Adoption of this stance would be a radical departure from the public position taken by every Indian government since 1990. The Environment Minister's proposal remains controversial in India, but it may well be an indicator of changes to come.
What events have catalyzed this development? As Subramanian (2009) notes, several political considerations are in play. The first is India's great-power ambition. Elements include its new status as a G-20 member, its aspiration to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and its desire to avoid playing second fiddle to China in negotiations with the US.
Some senior government officials apparently believe that a more accommodating stance on carbon emissions will enhance India's prospects in all these dimensions. Another factor is the perception that India has been losing the battle of the climate-change "narrative", in which it has forcefully argued that rich countries should shoulder the carbon mitigation burden because they have produced the climate problem. India's position has had little effect on the negotiating posture of the rich countries, and many respected international voices have continued urging India to join the mitigation effort. Finally, and possibly most important, the government has concluded that it should promote clean power anyway, in order to develop an internationally 1 competitive supplier industry, to bolster energy independence, and to help limit climate change because it will pose dire threats to India itself (Cline, 2007) .
Knowledge of these developments makes it easier to understand India's reaction to the US failure to enact cap-and-trade legislation, as well as the impasse at Copenhagen. Despite such setbacks, India has confounded expectations by moving to promote a low-carbon economy.
Although economic growth, universal energy access and energy security remain critical concerns, Indian policymakers have increasingly engaged the climate issue. The government announced an ambitious National Action Plan on Climate Change in June 2008, with eight initiatives to support emissions mitigation. It has established an Advisory Council on Climate Change, led by the Prime Minister, and it is one of the few national governments to have a ministry dedicated to renewable energy. India announced an ambitious National Solar Mission in August, 2009, and the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) is currently drafting a National Renewable Energy Policy that will provide a regulatory framework for promoting clean energy development (EIU, 2009a) . One important provision of this document is expected to be a national Renewable Energy Standard (RES) that will mandate an increasing percentage of total energy consumption from renewable sources.
To assess the significance of the proposed RES, this paper estimates the implied carbon emissions reduction and discusses its implications for India's international position. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of electricity generation and carbon emissions from India's power sector. In Section 3, we summarize recent Indian federal and state initiatives for renewable energy promotion. Section 4 assesses the magnitude of India's renewable energy commitment by estimating future carbon emissions reductions under the proposed national Renewable Energy Standard. Section 5 considers the implications for capacity expansion and cost, while Section 6 provides a summary and conclusions.
Power Generation and Carbon Emissions in India
Universal access to electricity remains a primary policy objective in India. India's heavy use of coal largely explains its status as the fourth-biggest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter in the world. India accounts for about 5% of global GHG emissions from fossil fuel combustion, although its per capita emissions remain very low (1.7 mt CO2 equivalent, vs.
23.5 for the US, 10.3 for the EU, 10.5 for Japan and 5.5 for China). India's electricity and heat sectors account for almost 57% of its total GHG emissions (WRI, 2009).
Renewable Energy Initiatives
Despite the relatively high cost of renewables, India's federal and state governments have recently promoted renewable energy, particularly solar power. In August 2009, the government published a "National Solar Mission" that aims to install 10,000 MW of solar capacity by 2020 
National RES Policy
There are strong indications that India will soon adopt a national RES policy that will bring more clarity, consistency and ambition to national renewable strategy. At a recent international conference, the chairman of the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) cited a tentative plan to introduce a nationwide RES of 5% for grid power purchased by state utilities by 2010, with an increase to 15% by 2020 (Business Standard, 2009 ). This plan has been proposed after submission of recommendations on national policy in November, 2008 by a working group of the National Forum of Regulators
The Potential Impact of the National Renewable Energy Standard
To gauge the potential impact of such a national RES, we quantify the emissions reductions that could be achieved by the CERC chairman's proposed target of 15% renewable energy by 2020. We construct two scenarios, Business as Usual (BAU) and RES (15% by 2020).
BAU Scenario:
To estimate the BAU energy mix in 2020, we project using growth trends since power-sector restructuring and the advent of significant privatization in 1991. Table 1 7 summarizes our results by energy source. In 2020, coal's share remains essentially unchanged at 68%. Oil, gas and nuclear energy have all expanded their shares, while the share of large hydro has fallen from 15.3% to 9.9%. Renewables have exhibited rapid growth, but from a low base, reaching a share of 3.5% by 2020.
We translate these shares to emissions estimates in several steps. First, we forecast India's power requirement in 2020 by adopting the projection for 2021-22 by the Central Electricity To project the associated CO2 emissions, we use fuel-specific CO2 intensities provided by the CEA in its baseline emissions database. 11 In the BAU scenario, CO2 emissions from the power sector grow from 576 million tons in 2006 to 1,627 million tons in 2020.
RES Scenario:
We adopt a best-case Renewable Energy Standard scenario, in which all increased generation from renewable sources offsets generation from coal, the most CO2-intensive fuel. In our RES scenario, increasing the renewable percentage to 15% by 2020 reduces the coal-fired percentage to 57%. The accompanying CO2 emissions increase from 576 million tons in 2006 to 1,380 million tons in 2020 (Table 2, Figure 6 ). By 2020, the difference 
Implications for Capacity Expansion and Cost
To assess the implications of such a large change, we have to translate the associated fuelbased electricity projections into installed capacities using plant load factors (PLFs --capacity utilization rates). Overall, the average PLF for thermal power plants in India has increased from 64.6% in 1998-99 to 78.8% in 2007-2008. 12 For this study, we assume a future PLF of 80% for thermal plants, as well as for nuclear and large hydro facilities. Taking a weighted average of PLFs for renewable power plants, we assume an overall PLF of 28% for renewables. We assess the potential cost implications of the RES using the most recently published cost estimates for power production by supercritical coal plants, concentrating solar power (CSP) facilities 13 and wind turbines. 14 Indian costs for coal, large-scale CSP and wind are currently about 5, 13 and 7 US cents/kWh, respectively. 15 Each cent/kWh difference between renewable power and coal translates to an equivalent emissions charge of about $10/ton CO2, 16 so substituting the two renewable technologies for coal-fired power is equivalent to accepting carbon emissions charges of $80/ton CO2 for CSP and $20/ton for wind. 17 Wind power is a relatively mature technology, so we expect its cost to be approximately stable through 2020. But we believe that learning and scale economies for CSP will reduce its cost difference from coalfired power to about 4 cents/kWh, equivalent to a marginal carbon emissions charge of $40/ton.
Assuming a linear cost decline, the average for the period 2010-2020 would be $60/ton.
In Section 4, we have estimated that India's adoption of a 15% RES would avert about 1.3 gigatons of CO2 emissions during the period 2010-2020. If CSP expansion accounted for the entire switch from coal-fired to renewable energy, with an average cost differential of 6 cents/kWh, India's adoption of the 15% RES would be equivalent to maintaining its BAU power expansion with a total CO2 charge of about $80 billion for emissions from new coal-fired power facilities during the period 2010-2020. In the case of wind power, the total CO2 charge would be about $27 billion. If we assume equal shares in renewable energy growth for CSP and wind, the total will be about $54 billion --a huge cost that will be voluntarily borne by India if the proposed national RES is adopted. 
Summary and Conclusions
Until recently, India's intransigent negotiating posture has conveyed the impression that it will not accept any carbon emissions limits without full compensation by rich countries and the adoption of more stringent carbon limitations by those countries. However, our assessment of serious consideration to adoption of a 15% RES for its own reasons, despite the absence of any meaningful international pressure to cut emissions, no guarantees of compensatory financing, and a continuing American failure to adopt stringent emissions limits. If India moves ahead with this plan, it will promote a massive shift of new power capacity toward renewables within a decade. As we have shown, the change will be cost-equivalent to India's acceptance of a total CO2 charge of about $50 billion for staying on the BAU path that its international posture has seemed to support. This is an enormous cost that will be voluntarily borne by a society that must still cope with widespread extreme poverty. If India moves ahead with its current plan, it should
give serious pause to those who have resisted US carbon regulation on the grounds on that it will confer a cost advantage on "intransigent" countries like India.
